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Abstract
Rapidly identifying the features of a covert release of an agent such as anthrax could help to inform the planning of public
health mitigation strategies. Previous studies have sought to estimate the time and size of a bioterror attack based on the
symptomatic onset dates of early cases. We extend the scope of these methods by proposing a method for characterizing
the time, strength, and also the location of an aerosolized pathogen release. A back-calculation method is developed
allowing the characterization of the release based on the data on the first few observed cases of the subsequent outbreak,
meteorological data, population densities, and data on population travel patterns. We evaluate this method on small
simulated anthrax outbreaks (about 25–35 cases) and show that it could date and localize a release after a few cases have
been observed, although misspecifications of the spore dispersion model, or the within-host dynamics model, on which the
method relies can bias the estimates. Our method could also provide an estimate of the outbreak’s geographical extent and,
as a consequence, could help to identify populations at risk and, therefore, requiring prophylactic treatment. Our analysis
demonstrates that while estimates based on the first ten or 15 observed cases were more accurate and less sensitive to
model misspecifications than those based on five cases, overall mortality is minimized by targeting prophylactic treatment
early on the basis of estimates made using data on the first five cases. The method we propose could provide early
estimates of the time, strength, and location of an aerosolized anthrax release and the geographical extent of the
subsequent outbreak. In addition, estimates of release features could be used to parameterize more detailed models
allowing the simulation of control strategies and intervention logistics.
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Introduction
If clinical cases of anthrax were detected, public health decision
makers would want to estimate as soon as possible the features of
the exposure event leading to the outbreak in order to determine
who has potentially been exposed and should receive prophylaxis
[1]. Relevant variables include the date of exposure and the
geographical extent of the outbreak. For example, data from the
US anthrax outbreak of 2001 have been retrospectively explored
to estimate the date of exposure of cases and how large the
outbreak would have been if exposed individuals had not been
treated [2,3]. Later, Walden and Kaplan proposed an alternative
method to estimate the time and size of an anthrax outbreak a few
days after the occurrence of the first case and tested it on simulated
data [4].
While the 2001 anthrax cases had been exposed through the US
postal service [1], if the exposure was due to an outdoor airborne
release other information such as the release location and the
potential exposed area might be inferred from the data on
observed cases. The methods discussed above do not allow the
release location or the geographical extent of exposure to be
estimated as they do not consider the localization of cases or the
size of potentially exposed populations. More recently, Hogan et
al. proposed the Bayesian Aerosol Release Detector (BARD)
allowing the estimation of posterior distributions of the location,
strength and date of a release based on pre-diagnostic (syndromic)
medical surveillance data and meteorological data [5]. They
evaluated the ability of the method to detect anthrax outbreaks
with syndromic surveillance data and showed that it was able to
detect simulated outbreaks with over 900 pre-diagnosed cases but
performed poorly for smaller outbreaks. So far, the ability of the
BARD to characterize a detected release has not been evaluated.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate the performance of a
back-calculation method to characterize a release from the
observation of the first few cases, population densities, meteoro-
logical conditions and population movements such as commuting
data. We considered that the causative agent would have been
identified from the first few cases and that the incubation period
distribution of the disease would be known. We also explore the
potential of our tool to inform the planning of mitigation strategies.
As a case study, we investigate a simulated release of Bacillus
anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax), given its prominence on
risk lists of pathogens and potential to be used in aerosolized
biological weapons [1,6].
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Probabilistic anthrax model
We developed a probabilistic model for an inhalational anthrax
outbreak following an instantaneous point source release. This
model has three components: 1) the dispersion of anthrax spores in
the atmosphere; 2) the within-host dynamics of anthrax spores; 3)
the spatio-temporal population dynamics. We did not take into
account cutaneous or gastrointestinal forms of anthrax.
The airborne dispersion of anthrax spores following an
instantaneous point source release was modeled using a puff
model weighted by the viability of spore concentration [7,8]; this
quantifies the average spore concentration at any location and
time. However, for practical reason, we assumed that the average
spore concentration was uniform over relatively small distances
that characterize the spatial unit of our back-calculation method,
i.e. Great Britain (GB) administrative wards, and equal to the
concentration given by the puff model at the ward centroid. For
each individual, the inhaled dose depends on the breathing rate
and the spore concentration at his/her work place (from 9 am to 7
pm) and his/her residence (from 7 pm to 9 am). Other parameters
such as the size of particles [1] would impact the inhaled dose but
were not taken into account in our analysis for the sake of
simplicity.
The within-host dynamics model describes the biological
processes of clearance, germination and growth of anthrax spores
within a host and was adapted from published models [3,9,10].
However, the model we developed considers continuous exposure
rather than just instantaneous exposure. Once anthrax spores are
inhaled into the lung, they are ingested by macrophages and can
be destroyed. Surviving spores may germinate and then replicate
[1]. Assuming that symptoms occur when the number of
germinated spores exceeds a given threshold [10], the probability
of developing disease can be written as the convolution of the
cumulative distribution function of the time from exposure to first
germination F1 and the density function of the time from first
germination to symptoms.
Finally, the dispersion model and the within-host dynamics
model are integrated with population density and movement data
to model the spatio-temporal dynamics of the outbreak. Full
details of the model are provided in Text S1.
Characterizing an anthrax release
We used a Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling algorithm [11]
to estimate the time T, height H, strength (log10(S) where S is the
number of released spores) and location W of the release. The
posterior distribution of the parameters is detailed in Text S1.
Given the rapid decline of spore concentration over time, we
considered that an individual’s entire dose was inhaled at the time
of the release rather than continuously from this date. Following
[12,13,14], we relied on the profile likelihood of the 3-dimension
parameter space T,H,S fg :
lp T,H,S fg j Y ðÞ ~LT ,H,S, ^ W WT ,H,S ðÞ
  Y

where L(.) is the likelihood function and Y are the observed data
(dates of symptoms onset, residences and workplaces), both of
which are presented in Text S1. ^ W WT ,H,S ðÞ maximizes
LT ,H,S,W fg j Y ðÞ with respect to W and the parameter space
T,H,S fg was explored with a standard Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm.
Evaluation of the method
To study the performance of our back-calculation method, we
simulated 40 anthrax outbreaks due to a release at time T=0of
strength S=10
10 spores in ward W=W0 at height H=100 m,
using the probabilistic model described above. We used population
and commuting data from the 1991 GB census for the 10,515
wards provided by the Office for National Statistics (see Text S1),
the same meteorological stability conditions as Wein and
colleagues used in a simulation study on the response planning
to an anthrax attack [15], and parameter values provided in
Table 1 [16]. Assuming that public health responses would ideally
be initiated after only a few cases have been detected, the first 5, 10
or 15 cases developing symptoms were considered to have been
observed. We then estimated the four parameters of the model
characterizing the release (T, log10(S), W, H). The other
parameters of the spore dispersion model and the within-host
dynamics model embedded within the back-calculation were set at
the literature-derived values used to generate the simulated data
(see Table 1).
We used medians of posterior distributions for height and
strength estimates. The posterior distribution of the time was
sometimes multimodal with local minima for night periods (we
simulated a release during the day) and the median could fall into
one of those local minima. Hence, to conserve the day/night
information provided by the posterior distribution, instead of the
time median, we discretized its posterior distribution into day/
night classes and chose the middle time of the mode class as the
point estimate. To estimate the release location, we also used the
mode of the posterior distribution. Root mean square errors
(RMSE) were used to summarize the quality of estimates (see
definitions in Text S1).
In order to understand how misspecification of aspects of the
model would impact estimation accuracy, we reproduced the
estimation procedure but deliberately misspecified either param-
eter values, data or the model structure. We examined 5 scenarios
(see Table 2):
Author Summary
Releasing highly pathogenic organisms into an urban
population is a form of bioterrorism that could result in a
large number of casualties. The first indication that a
covert open-air release has occurred is quite likely to be
individuals reporting for medical attention. If such an
attack is suspected, then public health authorities would
attempt to identify those individuals who have been
infected in order to provide rapid treatment with the aim
of reducing the possibility of disease and potential death.
Aiming treatment at too small an area might miss
individuals infected further down and/or up wind, whereas
issues surrounding both treatment resources and serious
side effects may rule out mass treatment campaigns of
large sections of the population. Our work provides
scientific robustness to firstly estimate where and when
an aerosolized release has occurred and secondly identify
the most critically affected geographic areas. In order to
use this statistical tool during an outbreak, public health
workers would only need to collect the time of symptom-
atic onset and the home and work locations of early cases;
recent weather information would also be required.
Although the accuracy of the estimates is likely to improve
as more cases appear, treating individuals based on early
estimates might prove more beneficial since time would
be of the essence.
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symptoms onset date was 0.5 days rather than one hour. We
considered that the symptoms onset hour of patients
developing symptoms between 9AM and 9PM would be
registered as 9AM, and 9PM for patients developing
symptoms between 9 PM and 9 AM.
B) Reference scenario dataset used, but median delay between
germination and symptoms of 5 days assumed in the back-
calculation model rather than the 2 days used to generate the
data.
In scenarios C to E, we simulated 40 outbreaks with three
modified versions of our model and then used the reference
scenario back-calculation model to fit these data:
C) Modification of the within-host dynamics model. Datasets
were generated using the reference scenario model but with
the within-host dynamics component replaced by the model
proposed by Brookmeyer et al for a low dose exposure [9]: the
attack rate was computed as limF1 t ðÞ
t??
and the cumulative
distribution function of the incubation period was
F  t ðÞ ~1z
he{gt{ge{ht
g{h with g=0.346 days
21 corresponding
to a median delay between germination and symptoms of 2
days.
D) Modification of the spore dispersion model. Datasets were
generated using the reference scenario model but with the
puff model of airborne dispersion replaced by the Hazard
Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) model [17].
The cumulative distribution function of the incubation
period was the same as in the reference scenario but
assumed an instantaneous exposure (see Text S1) and an
attack rate given by limF1 t ðÞ
t??
.
E) Modification of population movement assumptions. Instead
of considering only commuting data, we considered that due
to non-commuter travel, 10% of individuals could be
exposed during the day in wards different from the ward
where they would otherwise work. We considered that the
pattern of these occasional movements was similar to the
pattern of commuting movements. Hence, for 10% of cases,
we considered that the original workplace was actually an
occasional destination. The workplace of each of these cases
was then drawn from the distribution of workplaces of people
Table 1. Parameter Description and Values in the Reference Scenario.
Param. Description Units Value in the ref. scenario Ref
c Decay rate /sec 1.67610
24 [7]
l Germination rate /day 1610
25 [9]
h Clearance rate /day 0.109 [9]
r Growth rate /day 11.7 *
b Breathing rate m
3/min 0.03 [7]
k Threshold for the number of bacilli before symptoms bacilli 10
10 [16]
Median period between germination and symptoms days 2 [9]
Wind direction BNG (1,0)
u Wind speed m/s 5.0 [15]
T Date of the release days 0
S Number of released spores spores 10
10
H Height of the release m 100 [15]
W Source -W 0
BNG: British National Grid System.
*The growth rate was calibrated in order to have a median period between first germination and symptoms of 2 days according to equation (1.5) in Text S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.t001
Table 2. Description of Scenarios.
Scenario Modified model/data Misspecification type Description
A Symptoms onset dates
of the simulated sample
Uncertainty on data Onset dates precision=0.5 days rather than 1 hour .
For cases developing symptoms between 9AM and
9PM the registered time is 9 AM. For other cases the
registered time is 9 PM.
B Estimation Parameter value of the within-host
dynamics model
Median delay between germination and
symptoms=5 days rather than 2 days
C Simulation Within-host dynamics model Incubation period for low doses given by [9]
Instantaneous exposure
D Simulation Spore diffusion model Spore concentration given by HPAC model [17]
Instantaneous exposure
E Simulation Population movements Occasional movements added to daily commuting
data
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.t002
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we also tested a modified version of the reference scenario
back-calculation model by considering that people would
have a small probability per day (set at 0.1) to travel away
from their working place, with destinations being chosen
based on ward sizes and distance to usual workplace (see
Text S1 for details).
Comparison with other back-calculation methods
Past studies [4,18,19] have sought to characterize an anthrax
outbreak and, although they were not designed to estimate the
release location, it is possible to compare the exposure date and
outbreak size estimates they provide with our estimates. We ran
our own versions of the Walden and Kaplan method [4] and the
algorithm proposed by Ray et al [18] on the datasets generated
with the reference scenario and scenarios C and D using the same
incubation period distribution as in our algorithm. As the Walden
and Kaplan method [4] assumes that the incubation period is not
dose dependent, we used a low dose exposure (10 spores) although
it should be noted that order of magnitude increases in the dose
made little difference to the estimates (results not shown).
Implication for mitigation policies
In terms of helping to plan mitigation strategies, the first issue
we examined was whether our estimates would allow the
prediction of the outbreak extent from data on the first few cases.
We also examined whether the model could accurately infer the
geographical extent of the outbreak, i.e. where and how many
people had been exposed. Indeed, this could help to target
interventions (such as prophylaxis and decontamination) at the
most exposed populations for mitigation strategies and to assess the
scale of effort (e.g. numbers of antibiotic courses) required. We
considered a mitigation strategy whereby people living or working
in a ward with a risk of being clinically infected greater than a
given threshold (from 10
25 to 10
28) would be targeted for
prophylactic treatment. The risk attributed to each ward was
defined as the risk of developing disease following an exposure in
this ward at the release time. We compared the model-inferred risk
estimates (using risk posterior distribution medians) with the
model-inferred risk values calculated with the real parameter
values. To explore further the effectiveness of a targeted mitigation
strategy based on the back-calculation model estimates, we
determined how many cases would be prevented if all individuals
exposed to a given risk according to our estimates received a 100%
effective prophylactic treatment. We considered that the treatment
would be administered 4 days after the 5
th,1 0
th or 15
th case had
occurred to allow for a lag time between symptomatic onset of the
last observed case and diagnosis, estimation, planning and
implementation of interventions. In addition, treatment was
assumed to prevent disease for all symptom-free individuals.
Finally, we compared the efficiency of the strategy described
above with a ‘‘ring strategy’’ not requiring sophisticated analytical
and computational methods. For this ‘‘ring strategy’’, the wards
considered at risk were located in the neighborhood of wards
where the greatest number of cases had been detected (workplaces
and residences were included). We selected as neighbors all wards
having its centroid within a given distance of at least one of the
centroids of the J most affected wards.
Results
Although we simulated outbreaks following a release in a
populated area, the set of parameters we used lead to relatively
small simulated outbreaks (average size=27, range=19–39, see
the risk map in Figure 1 and the description of the simulated
outbreaks in Text S1).
Characterizing anthrax releases
Figure 2 (reference scenario) shows that we were able to localize
and date the release with accuracy when using 10 cases. As shown
in Text S1, using the median as date point estimates rather than
the centre of the mode class gave similar results. Although
decreasing the number of observed cases to 5 lowered the ability of
the method to localize the release (real source identified in 17/40
outbreaks versus 32/40 with 10 observed cases), it was still able to
date the release with accuracy (error,10 hours for 33/40
simulated outbreaks). Furthermore, the distance from the
estimated source to the real source did not exceed 7.4 km with
5 observed cases and 3.8 km with 10 observed cases (average
Figure 1. Map of the risk of anthrax infection (attack rates) in
each ward for all scenarios except scenario D. The cross on the
main map represents the location of all simulated releases. The inset
map represents population-weighted ward centroids (crosses) and their
Voronoi diagram (polygons).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.g001
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height of the release was more difficult to characterize and was
correlated with the strength of the release (correlation of 0.78 on
average). Bias could reach more than twice the real height and
posterior distributions estimated with 5 observed cases were often
flat (95% credible interval width was up to 1220 meters). An
example of the 4 parameters posterior distributions estimated with
data from 5, 10 or 15 observed cases is shown in Text S1. When
comparing the estimated expected number of cases with the real
expected number of cases, the root mean square relative error (see
Figure 2. Histograms of the release location (left column) and date (right column) estimates for the 40 simulated outbreaks with
Reference scenario (Ref.) and scenarios A to E. The release location is represented by the distance to the real source. For the date estimates,
breaks were set at 9 AM and 7 PM and counts are represented by bar heights rather than bar surfaces. For two outbreaks of scenario D, the source
location estimated with 5 observed cases was further than 12 kilometers (14.3 and 18.2 km). For scenario E, the source location estimated with 5
observed cases was further than 35 kilometers for two outbreaks (57 and 68 km), the source location estimated with 10 observed cases was further
than 35 kilometers for one outbreak (57 km), the source location estimated with 15 observed cases was further than 35 kilometers for two outbreaks
(45 km and 117 km).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.g002
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5 cases to 45% for estimates based on 10 cases (see Table 3).
Sensitivity analysis
With scenario A, although estimates of the timing of release
were slightly modified (for estimates based on 5 cases, difference
ranged 0–2 days), the bias was below 10 hours for 80% of the
simulated outbreaks. The accuracy of the source location estimates
was not affected (see Figure 2).
Similarly, increasing the median delay between spore germina-
tion and symptoms from 2 to 5 days in the estimation algorithm
(scenario B) modified estimates of the time of release by 71 hours
on average (compared to the reference scenario estimates) but it
did not modify the performance of the method to characterize the
release location. Misspecifying further the within-host dynamics
model (scenario C) by simulating symptomatic onset dates with the
incubation period distribution for low doses proposed by
Brookmeyer and colleagues [9] affected the precision of the
release date estimates (RMSE about 24 hours with scenario C
versus 12 hours with the reference scenario) but the estimates of
Figure 3. Comparison of the estimates based on the standard model (M1) with estimates based on the model allowing for
occasional movements during the day (M2). Estimates of the height (A), strength (B) and location (C) of the source for outbreaks simulated with
Scenario E, based on the first 5 (blue), 10 (red), 15 (green) observed cases. (D) Ratio of the number of individuals inaccurately targeted (IC) by the
mitigation strategy for a risk threshold of 1/100,000 relative to the theoretical number of individuals at risk (%). Triangles indicate estimates for
simulations in which there is no observed case infected during an occasional movement. Rectangles indicate estimates for simulations in which there
is at least one observed case infected during an occasional movement. The horizontal and vertical lines indicate the true values. The third line is the
bisector.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.g003
Table 3. Performance of the Back-calculation Method to Fit
the Expected Outbreak Size.
Coverage
* (%) RMSE1 (%) Error range
**
# observed
cases 5 10 15 5 10 15 5 10 15
Reference 95 95 95 71 45 32 0–215 1–137 3–83
A
{ 80 95 95 103 50 33 2–237 0–143 2–102
B
{ 95 95 95 71 45 32 0–212 1–141 2–83
C
{ 90 97.5 100 89 32 22 4–478 1–82 1–72
D
{ 80 87.5 85 141 72 54 2–427 1–232 3–201
E
{ 87.5 90 90 90 52 35 2–412 1–189 1–119
RMSE1=Relative root mean square error (see definition in Text S1).
*The coverage is defined as the probability that the real value falls in the (2.5
th,
97.5
th) percentiles interval of the posterior distribution.
**Range of the absolute relative error (%).
{See Table 2 and Methods for description of scenarios A to E.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.t003
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accurate (see Figure 2 and Text S1) .
When we used a different spore dispersion model (HPAC) to
simulate outbreaks (scenario D), the source location estimates
based on 5, 10 and 15 observed cases were somewhat (though not
catastrophically) impaired (RMSE=4.6, 1.2, 0.6 km respectively
versus 2.0, 0.9, 0.7 km with the reference scenario). Release height
and strength estimates were also biased (see Text S1) but the
release date estimates remained accurate. Increasing the number
of observed cases from 10 to 15 increased substantially the quality
of the source location estimates whereas this wasn’t the case for the
reference scenario and scenarios A to C for which the RMSE of
the source location estimates based on 10 observed cases were less
than 1 km.
Finally, if some of the observed cases had been exposed during an
occasional stay in a ward different from their home (for night
release) or workplace (for day release) as in scenario E, our back-
calculation method could fail to identify the actual source location.
The release date estimates remained accurate (RMSE was about
9 hours for T) but the quality of the height and strength estimates
was impaired (for estimates based on 5 cases, RMSE was 320 m for
H and 0.97 for log10(S) versus 85 m and 0.46 respectively for the
reference scenario). Indeed, for several simulations, one or more
cases did not live or work within the exposed area but to encompass
these cases in the estimated exposed area, the release location
estimates were chosen upwind of the real location, also affecting the
height and strength estimates (see Text S1). Increasing the number
of observed cases did not necessarily improve the quality of
estimates as it increased the probability to observe cases infected
during an occasional stay in a ward different from their home or
workplace. To avoid this issue, we modified the model embedded in
the back-calculation; for simulations where at least one case had
been infected during an occasional movement, location estimates
derived from this modified model were much improved (Figure 3).
Overall, with this later model, the quality of estimates improved
with the number of observed cases (see Text S1) though the distance
to the real source RMSE was greater when estimates were based on
10 rather than 5 observed cases.
Comparison with other back-calculation methods
The comparison of the release date and outbreak size estimates
provided by previously published methods with our results shows
that performance of the three methods were similar (see Text S1).
Implication for mitigation policies
Figure 4 shows that outbreak size estimates were accurate up to
an order of magnitude but that relative bias for the reference
scenario was up to 120% with estimates based on the first 5 cases
and up to 70% with estimates based on 10 cases.
Regarding mitigation policies, key is how many people might be
missed by a risk-targeted strategy guided by the model estimates,
and how many would be inaccurately considered at risk. Both of
these numbers varied substantially from one simulated outbreak to
another (see Figure 5). For a risk threshold of 1 case per 100,000
inhabitants and estimates based on 5 observed cases, the median
proportion of at-risk individuals missed by targeting was less than
8%, for any scenario, with 3
rd quartiles under 20% for all scenarios
(see Figure 5a). The location of those exposed wards missed by the
targeting strategy and those wards inaccurately considered at risk
is shown in Text S1. For any scenario other than E and estimates
based on 10 or 15 observed cases, the median number of
individuals inaccurately considered at risk was about 5–8% of
those actually at risk (see Figure 5b) but was larger when the
simulated outbreaks included local occasional movements (see
scenario E, estimates based on 15 cases). Most of the wards
inaccurately considered as exposed with scenario E estimates are
in the west of the exposed area (see Text S1). Figure 5c shows the
actual numbers at risk as a function of the risk threshold used. For
Scenario E, using a model which took account of occasional
movements decreased the number of individuals inaccurately
considered at risk (see Figure 3d).
On average, the impact of the targeting strategy on outbreak
size was greater when applied after the 5 first cases have occurred
(see Figure 5d). With the reference scenario and estimates based on
5 cases, 221,000 to 642,000 individuals were treated and 1 to 21
cases were avoided (median=12.5 cases). With the release features
we used for the simulation, using a risk threshold of 1/100,000
Figure 4. Performance of the back-calculation method to predict the outbreak size with Reference scenario (R) and scenarios A to E.
Each box-plot represents the distribution (minimum, maximum, percentiles 2.5,25,50,75,97.5) of the predicted outbreak size relative bias based on
the 5, 10 and 15 first cases on 40 simulated outbreaks per scenario.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.g004
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saved while a lower threshold did not save significantly more lives
but required substantially larger numbers to be treated (see Text
S1).
As shown in Text S1, on average, the strategy based on our
estimates seems to be more efficient than a ‘‘ring strategy’’ around
the 3 most affected wards (J=3) which could require more
antibiotic courses to prevent an equivalent number of cases. With
Scenario E, our back-calculation method embedding the model
taking into account local occasional movements seemed to be the
most efficient.
Discussion
Here we have developed and tested a back-calculation model to
characterize an airborne release of anthrax spores from data on
Figure 5. Impact of the targeting mitigation strategy with Reference scenario (R) and scenarios A to E. (A) Ratio of the number of
individuals missed by the targeting mitigation strategy for a risk threshold of 1/100,000 relative to the theoretical number of individuals at risk. (B)
Ratio of the number of individuals inaccurately targeted by the mitigation strategy for a risk threshold of 1/100 000 relative to the theoretical number
of individuals at risk. (C) Number of individuals at risk according to the model used to generate the data. (D) Impact of administrating treatments to
individuals living or working in a ward exposed to a risk of at least 1/100 ,000 inhabitants: outbreak size when there is no treatment and when
prophylactic treatment compliance and efficacy is 100% prior to the onset of symptoms and administered 4 days after the first 5, 10 or 15 cases
occurred. Each box-plot represents the distribution (minimum, maximum, percentiles 2.5, 25, 50, 75, 97.5) of the total number of cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000356.g005
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density and movement data. Our simulation study shows that this
method could provide accurate results even after only a few cases
of a small outbreak have been observed.
Overall, in the event of an outdoor airborne release, the source
location could accurately be identified although misspecifications
of the spore dispersion model (scenario D) might slightly affect the
quality of the estimates. Indeed, for a given dose, the HPAC model
gave a larger geographical extent of the release than the puff
model (see Figure 5c) affecting source location estimates; these
differences might be partly explained by differences in the
dispersion parameters of the two models. Our results suggest that
increasing the number of observed cases would improve the source
location estimates substantially. Different spore dispersion models
have been proposed [7] and could be tested in further uncertainty
analyses of our back-calculation estimates; if an instantaneous
exposure was still considered a reasonable assumption then the
spore dispersion model component could be easily modified in our
algorithm.
In the spore dispersion model we used, we set the wind direction
and speed at a fixed value both in the outbreak simulations and the
back-calculation algorithms. However, our method could be
refined to integrate more sophisticated datasets allowing the
meteorological conditions to vary with time and to be imperfectly
recorded.
The source location estimate would also probably be affected by
misspecifications of population movements (scenario E). Indeed, if
one or more observed cases had been exposed during local (or
long) distance occasional movements then the quality of estimates
would be impaired. We therefore developed a modified model that
allowed for exposure due to occasional movements. Including this
model in the back-calculation algorithm improved the location
estimates when occasional movements were included in the
simulated data, although the computational time required for
estimation increased markedly. Hence, the standard model could
provide a first set of estimates which could then be refined using
the more elaborate model with occasional movements included.
The release date estimate might be biased if the within-host
dynamics, and consequently the incubation period, were mis-
specified (scenarios B and C): different incubation period
distributions could also be tested in further uncertainty analyses.
Also, the within-host model used here could be extended to deal
with continuous, rather than instantaneous releases, though this
would require further development of the incubation period
models which have been proposed for inhalation anthrax [9,10].
Lastly, the impact of under-reporting of cases remains to be
examined (we assumed a 100% reporting rate) but is likely to only
affect estimates of the overall size of release, and perhaps its timing
(if under-reporting varies through time). On the contrary, a lack of
specificity might bias the source location estimates. Though this
remains to be evaluated, the location estimates provided by the
second model we introduced might be less sensitive to false cases.
Our analysis shows that characterizing an outbreak would help
to predict its final size and to assist in targeting the exposed
population requiring prophylactic treatment. Although the
exposed population cannot be precisely estimated (both the
number of missed individuals and inaccurately targeted individuals
could be substantial), treating the population estimated to be at
risk using our back-calculation method could substantially reduce
the number of symptomatic cases, and therefore deaths. However,
our estimates of the number of cases which might be prevented
represent a best case: we assumed that both compliance with
treatment and its efficacy were 100% prior to the onset of
symptoms. Further analysis should be carried out to take into
account the impact of sub-optimal compliance and lower
treatment efficacy [20]. How other parameters such as the
incubation period distribution or the delay between outbreak
detection and treatment would affect the efficacy of mitigation
strategies and their impact remains to be explored.
A limitation of our method is the assumption of a common
single source outbreak. If the outbreak was due to multiple
releases, the spore dispersion component of our model could be
modified to account for several sources. However, this would
increase the number of parameters to estimate (four for each
source) and could make the estimation based on a small number of
observed cases less accurate or impossible. In addition, determin-
ing the number of sources could also be challenging. This problem
might depend on the spatial separation of the sources; very widely
spaced and more discrete ‘‘clusters’’ of cases might be quite
obvious allowing their independent analysis. Some epidemiological
oversight would obviously be key in such circumstances.
Our estimates could be used to parameterize models which have
been developed to estimate the optimum duration of antibiotic
treatments [3,20,21] and to evaluate various mitigation interven-
tions following an anthrax release [15]. Other work in this latter
area has shown that rapidity of intervention would be a key issue
for the control of an outbreak and has proposed the use of
biosensors. Better characterizing the release with the method we
propose and thus estimating which areas were exposed would also
help to decrease the delay in planning a targeted emergency
response; it could also represent an alternative tool if biosensor
data were not available.
Comparing our model with others in the literature, previous
models provided estimates of the release date and the outbreak size
but not the location [4,18,19]. Furthermore, the performance of
our method was equal to that of the existing models at estimating
both the release date and the outbreak size. All such back-
calculation methods require knowledge about the timing of
symptom onset which may not always be captured by early
outbreak investigation studies depending on the systems that are in
place. If hospital admission dates were available instead, the
release date estimate could be biased though we have shown that
the date estimate is only slightly sensitive to a 12 hours uncertainty
in symptom onset dates. However, our model could also be refined
to integrate a delay between symptomatic onset and hospital
admission (see Hogan’s presentation in http://www.galaxy.gmu.
edu/QMDNS2007/). Incorporating the date of symptomatic
onset and also the residence and workplace of cases into
surveillance systems could shorten the delay between the
occurrence of the first cases and the implementation of relevant
mitigation strategies, notably by allowing the use of appropriate
analytical methods, such as the one we propose here, as soon as
possible. In the event of an anthrax outbreak in GB, we are
anticipating having the data from detailed field epidemiological
studies which should in most cases include symptoms onset dates
and home/work locations (see for example the legionella outbreak
investigation guidelines http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb-
File/HPAweb_C/1194947321368).
We have focused on evaluating our spatial back-calculation
model for small outbreaks. In the case of a large outbreak, the
rapid accumulation of cases and their locations would probably
allow localization of the exposure event without the need for
sophisticated methods. Nonetheless, the methods we developed
here could be used for large outbreaks if statistical rigor was a key
requirement for any analysis and to help with the early
identification of the spatial extent of the release and the
geographical targeting of antibiotic therapy. Application of this
type of model to the airborne release of an agent capable of being
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plague) would be feasible at the very beginning of an epidemic
(before any transmission is likely to have occurred). But if
secondary cases were suspected, our method would need further
development to take into account the transmission process.
Supporting Information
Text S1 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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